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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GIDEON POLLESCHE and
MARIA POLLESCHE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

12555

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF CASE
The plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages
from Transamerica Insurance Company under their
policy's uninsured motorist clause, for personal injuries
arising out of a rear end automobile accident on State
Street in Murray, Utah, on Wednesday, December 6,
1967, at 1: 04 p.m.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs appeal to this Court from a jury verdict of
no cause of action against both the plaintiff driver and
plaintiff passenger. Thereafter the trial court denied
plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
verdict and Motion for New Trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is undisputed that Thora G. Patterson, an uninsured

motorist, ran into the rear of plaintiffs' automobile on
December 6, 1967, at about 1: 04 p.m. while both cars
were traveling north on State Street in Murray, Utah,
resulting in personal injury to the plaintiff driver and
owner Gideon Pollesche, and also to the plaintiff, nonowner passenger, Mrs. Maria Pollesche (Tr. 162, 166,
167, 180).
It is also undisputed that at the time of the said acci-

dent, a Transamerica Automobile insurance policy was
in force entitling plaintiffs to recover damages for personal injury sustained as a result of the accident with
the uninsured motorist, Thora G. Patterson, if she were
found to be legally liable (Tr. 36, 167).
It is undisputed that the rear end collision of the two
cars occurred in the north bound inside lane of State
Street past the intersection on Vine Street which is
controlled by a traffic semaphore (Tr. 177-178).

The plaintiff Gideon Pollesche states that he went
through the intersection of State Street and Vine on a
green light about 25 miles per hour and that there were
two cars in front of him so he took his foot off the
accelerator and slowed to a little bit less than 25 miles
per hour when he was hit in the rear. Pollesche also
denies that he put his foot on the brake (Tr.186).
David Weston, a Deputy Sheriff, investigated the
accident and testified that it had snowed most of the
morning and by the time the accident occurred, it was
sunny, the roads were wet and visibility was good and
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that he saw no skid marks (Tr. 177, 179). The officer
also testified that in conversation with Mrs. Patterson
at the scene she told him, "she had bent down to do
something with her purse and when she looked up the
collision occurred." (Tr. 182) The investigating officer
also testified that he had made a note of Mrs. Patteron's
statement about her picking up her purse in his accident
report (Tr. 183). The plaintiff Gideon Pollesche testified
th::it in response to the Deputy Sheriff's question of why
did she hit plaintiff's car, Mrs. Patterson replied that,
"her purse fell down from the front seat and she bent
down to pick up the purse when she hit plaintiff's car."
(Tr.189).
Thora Patterson's version of the accident was that as
she came north on State Street she did not know when
or where the Pollesche car came in front of her (Tr. 165),
but she first noticed it, she "imagines about Vine Street,"
but said she really didn't know where she first noticed
the Pollesche car only that it was when he started putting
on his brakes (Tr. 165). Mrs. Patterson also stated that
Mr. Pollesche kept putting on his brakes (Tr. 165), and
later (Tr. 172) says he put them on three times and that
it irritated her and she repeated several times (Tr. 164,
165, 166, 168, 172), that she was concerned and wondering why he was putting on his brakes and that she knew
he was putting on his brakes because she could see his
brake lights going on and off (Tr. 167). Mrs. Patterson
related that she "imagines" that Mr. Pollesche kept
applying the brakes from Vine Street to the place of the
accident (Tr. 172). After Mrs. Patteron says she was
concerned and wondered what Mr. Pollesche was going
to do because of his putting his brakes on and off, Mrs.
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Patteron was then one car length, or about 20 feet,
behind Mr. Pollesche at a speed of 25 miles per hour and
she testifies (Tr. 166, 167, 171), that she then became
aware and it was clear to her that the Pollesche car was
going to stop and then the impact occurred. It is unclear
from Mrs. Patterson's testimony whether she got her
brakes on before impact inasmuch as she says at one
point that she got her brakes on and then changed her
testimony and said she did not know if she applied her
brakes before she hit him or not (Tr. 166), and then
still later in answer to another question says she,
"imagines" her brakes took hold before impact.
On two different occasions in her testimony (Tr. 162,
166), Mrs. Patterson intimates that it was obvious to her
that because she ran into the rear of the Pollesche car,
she was at fault and finally at the end of her examination
by plaintiffs' attorney, in response to the question, "Why
were you concerned about the plaintiff Maria Pollesche?"
(Tr. 166), Mrs. Patterson answered:
" ... and I got out of my car and immediately and
went up and I asked her if I could help her and if I
had hurt her. And she said, 'I can't talk to you.' She
said, 'I am in pain, and I can't talk to you.' And I, I was
concerned. I am a mother and I was concerned about
her welfare more than I was concerned about wrecked
cars or anything else. I was concerned about somebody
being hurt, because I was the cause of the accident."
[Emphasis added.] (Tr. 167)
It was undisputed in the trial that both the plaintiff

Gideon Pollesche and the plaintiff Maria Pollesche were
injured as a result of the accident and although there
was a dispute as to the extent and nature of the injuries,
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all of the witnesses, the plaintiffs, Mrs. Patterson, the
police officer and Dr. Neal C. Capel gave testimony
relating to plaintiffs' injuries and there was no testimony
or evidence that the plaintiffs were not injured in the
accident. (Tr- Ibo; 17
2 7
2 3 </ )
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND THE PLAINTIFF PASSENGER, MARIA POLLESCHE, SHOULD RECEIVE A DIRECTED VERDICT
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ON THE ISSUE OF
LIABILITY, AND A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES
BASED ON THE FACT THAT ALL OF THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWS THAT MRS. PATTERSON,
THE UNINSURED DRIVER, WAS NEGLIGENT AND
MARIA POLLESCHE WAS INJURED IN THE ACCIDENT.
The question of whether the defendant, Transamerica
Insurance Company was liable to the plaintiff passenger,
Maria Pollesche, in the Court below was based solely on
the issue of whether Mrs. Patterson, the uninsured driver,
was negligent and whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the rear end collision, since there was no
evidence submitted to the Court or any question put to
the jury concerning Maria Pollesche's contributory
negligence and also because there was substantial evidence, with no evidence at all to the contrary, that the
plaintiff, Mrs. Pollesche, was injured in the accident
(Tr. 167, 171, 234, 277).
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It is basic law that a judgment and verdict of the lower
court will not be sustained when it is plainly wrong and
manifestly against the weight of the evidence. People
v. Swasey, 6 Ut. 93, 21 Pac. 400. Furthermore, a case
should not be left to the jury but is a question of law
for the court if the facts are such that only one reasonable
inference or conclusion can be drawn therefrom on the
question of negligence, 65 A C.J.S. Negligence, Sec. 253,
p. 824.
An examination of the record in this case clearly shows
that the only reasonable inference or conclusion that can
be drawn from the evidence is that Thora Patterson,
the uninsured rear ending driver, was negligent and
such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
It was Mrs. Patterson's duty to use reasonable care
under the circumstances in driving her car to avoid
danger to herself and others and to observe and be aware
of the conditions of the highway, the traffic thereon,
and other existing conditions. She was also obliged to
use reasonable care to keep a lookout for other vehicles.
She had the duty to drive at such speed as was safe and
reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, having
due regard to the width, surface, and conditions of the
highway, the traffic thereof and any actual or potential
hazzards then existing. Mrs. Patterson had the further
duty not to follow plaintiffs' vehicle more closely than
was reasonable and prudent having due regard for her
own speed, the speed of other such traffic, other traffic
upon the highway, and all other conditions there existing,
and to keep at such distance and maintain such control
of her automobile as was prudent for the safety of herself
and others. W eenig Bros. v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101,

7

262 P.2d 491; 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles, Sec. 284, p. 141.
See also, 41-6-62, Utah Code Anno., 1953; 60 C.J.S. Motor
Vehicles, Sec. 326.

The record in this case discloses that all of the evidence
on the subject of Mrs. Patterson's duty to observe the
foregoing standard of care is such that reasonable minds
could not differ that she was negligent. The only evidence
with regard to the weather and conditions of the road
were that the road was wet from melted snow and it was
a sunny day with good visibility (Tr. 177). It was 1:04
in the afternoon and the accident occurred on State
Street between the intersection of Vine Street in Murray,
Utah, and the next street a half a block north, both of
which were controlled at the time by a traffic semaphore
(Tr. 177). Mrs. Patterson states that she was traveling
25 to 30 miles per hour (Tr. 166), and that she did not
know how long she had been following the Pollesche
car or where or when he came in front of her except
that she first noticed him when she saw his brake lights
come on, she "imagines" somewhere around Vine Street
and the red light (Tr. 165, 172). Mrs. Patterson also
states that she saw the brake lights go on and off on the
Pollesche car and that he kept putting on his brakes and
that she was concerned about it and wondering why and
thought about going around him but also thought there
might be a child or a dog or something in front of the
Pollesche car and also she alleges she saw no car in
front of the Pollesche car. She states that as many times
as he applied his brakes, she thought there must have
been some reason for it (Tr. 162, 164, 165, 168). Mrs.
Patterson even says that she became irritated because
Mr. Pollesche kept putting on his brakes. Besides having
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the record replete with evidence that Mrs. Patterson,
at least from her version of the accident, had more than
adequate warning by the plaintiff driver that he was
stopping or slowing, she also testifies that when it became
clear to her and she was aware that he was going to,
"come to a stop, a complete stop," her best judgment was
that she was following the plaintiffs' automobile at a
distance of one car length or about 20 feet and the only
evidence of her speed at that time was still 25 to 30
miles an hour (Tr. 171, 166). The evidence from the police
officer was that he could see no brake marks on the wet
pavement and Mrs. Patterson testified first that she got
her brakes on before impact and then changed her testimony and said she did not know if she got her brakes
on before impact or not and still later says she "imagines"
her brakes took hold (Tr. 166, 171).
In addition to the foregoing testimony which was
brought out from both direct and cross-examination and
which is the sum and substance of Mrs. Patterson's
version of the facts of the accident, she states right at
the beginning of her testimny that her car came in contact with the Pollesche car and that:
" ... after I hit him, I didn't get out of the car. I just
sat in the car, because anyone that does drive, I'm
sure that we all know, that if you hit somebody from
behind, that is, your're out. And I was sure that I had
insurance. There was no question about it. So I wasn't
worried about it . . . and I found out later that my
husband hadn't paid the policy ... so I was not insured." [Emphasis added.] (Tr. 162-163)
Also, in response to a question about her physical condition after the impact, Mrs. Patterson said:
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" ... I was kind of upset about it. But like I said,
I thought, well, I have hit somebody from ... in the
rear and all you can do is just sit here and wait for
the police to come and see what is going to happen.
And I was very concerned about Mrs. Pollesche and
she ...
. . . I was concerned about somebody being hurt,
because I was the cause of the accident." (Tr. 166, 167)
Mrs. Patterson then concludes her entire testimony at
the trial with the following statement:
" ... it was my responsibility. I hit that car and I
was concerned about the people and the people in
that car." (Tr. 175)
It follows from the above, that the evidence in the

record when viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant and respondent, fails to sustain the verdict of
no cause of action against the nonnegligent plaintiff
passenger, Maria Pollesche.
POINT II
IF THE PLAINTIFF PASSENGER, MARIA POLLESCHE, IS GRANTED A NEW TRIAL ON THE
ISSUE OF LIABILITY, THEN THE PLAINTIFF,
GIDEON POLLESCHE SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE A
NEW TRIAL SINCE IT IS UNKNOWN FROM THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHETHER THE
VERDICT WAS BASED ON A FINDING OF NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF MRS. PATTERSON,
WHICH IS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE OR WHETHER
IT WAS BASED ON PLAINTIFFS' CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE.
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There were four verdicts presented to the jury below
for their consideration (Tr. 116, 117, 118, 119). The first
was for a finding in favor of the plaintiff Gideon Pollesche and against the defendan.t assessing damages, the
second was for a finding for the plaintiff Maria Pollesche
and against the defendant and assessing damages, the
third was for a finding in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff Gideon Pollesche no cause of action, ,
and the fourth was for a finding in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff Maria Pollesche no
cause of action. The latter two verdicts were signed and
the judgment and verdict given was no cause of action
against both plaintiffs.
Because the verdict was no cause of action against
the plaintiff Maria Pollesche, a nonowner passenger,
who could not have possibly been contributorily negligent, the only logical basis upon which a no cause of
action verdict against Maria Pollesche could rest, would
be a finding of no negligence on the part of the uninsured
driver Thora Patterson. If plaintiffs' contention as argued
in Point I is assumed, that is that a finding of no negligence on the part of Mrs. Patterson is against the evidence and Maria Pollesche is entitled to a new trial, then
justice and reason would demand a new trial also for
Gideon Pollesche. If the only basis for a no cause of
action verdict against Maria Pollesche was that the jury
found no negligence on the part of the rear ending driver,
then it necessarily follows that there is no way of determining whether the jury found no cause of action against
the plaintiff driver, Gideon Pollesche, for the same
reason, or whether in addition thereto found him to be
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contributorily negligent. It is, therefore, logically necessary to grant a new trial to the plaintiff Gideon Pollesche
if a new trial is granted to Maria Pollesche.
'

P01NT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set forth
under Points I and II in addition to the following:
In weighing the testimony of the uninsured driver,
Mrs. Patterson, in the light most favorable to the dedendant and prevailing party in the Court below, the
consideration of her testimony should not be restricted
to isolated portions thereof, but all of her testimony,
including that given on direct and on cross-examination,
should be considered as a whole. Alvarado v. Tucker,
2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986, citing Putnam v. Industrial
Commission, 80 Utah 187, 14 P.2d 973, 981. Although
there are portions of Mrs. Patterson's testimony which
might be consistent with a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff Gideon Pollesche, all
portions of her testimony are consistent with a lack of
due care and hence negligence on her part.
If the jury had followed the plaintiffs' instructions
(Tr. 82), on the duty of the uninsured driver, Mrs. Patterson, to use reasonable care under the circumstances
of the facts of this case, and the Court's instructions on
negligence and proximate cause, it would have been
impossible for them to have reached the verdict they
reached in this case because even if they chose to believe
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all of the rear ending driver's version of the facts as to
her own actions, including her own acknowledgment
of fault while testifying in Court under oath about a
conclusion she was competent to testify about, and none
of the plaintiffs' or the investigating officer' testimony,
there is no way this kind of accident could have occurred
without a failure of the uninsured motorist to exercise
ordinary care.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs contend that the only reasonable inference
or conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is
that Thora Patterson, the uninsured rear ending driver,
was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of the accident in question. Plaintiffs further contend that even if all of the evidence and testimony in
favor of the plaintiffs as to liability is entirely disregarded, Mrs. Patterson's testimony considered as a whole
would sustain plaintiffs' position, since there is no possibility of holding Maria Polesche contributorily negligent, and also because there is substantial evidence with
none contrary that Maria Pollesche received injuries
as a direct result of the accident in question.
It is clear that if plaintiffs' position on Point I is
sustained, that it would be manifestly unfair not to give
the plaintiff Gideon Pollesche a new trial on the issue
of liability inasmuch as there is no way of telling from
the verdict of the court below whether the no cause of
action against Gideon Pollesche was because the jury
found no negligence on the part of Thora Patterson,
which is against the evidence, or whether it was based
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on the plaintiff Gideon Polesche's contributory negligence. It is completely unknown whether the jury ever
got to the point of determining whether Gideon Pollesche
was contributorily negligent and, therefore, he should
have an oportunity to have his case reheard if his wife's
case is reheard.
In weighing the testimony of Thora Patterson as a

whole including her admission and acknowledgment
against interest that she was a fault, the only determination to be made is the damages suffered by the plaintiff
Maria Pollesche and whether the plaintiff Gideon Pollesche was guilty of contributory negligence. This Court
should, therefore, set aside the judgment and verdict
of the lower court and remand the case to that court
for a jury determination upon the question of damages
only for the plaintiff Maria Pollesche and for a new
trial as to the liability for the plaintiff Gideon Pollesche.
Respectfully submited,
DONN E. CASSITY
EUGENE H. DAVIS
404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants

